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Airline Consolidations and
Competition Law—What Next? 
Roger W. Fones*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, there has been an increase in airline industry 
consolidation, both within the United States domestically as well as abroad. 
In the U.S., six of the remaining “legacy” network airlines1 consolidated into 
three, and some low cost point-to-point carriers have merged as well. Among 
legacy carriers, Northwest and Delta merged in 2008, United and Continental 
in 2010, and most recently, American and US Airways in 2013. In 2011, 
major low cost carriers Southwest and AirTran also merged. On the 
international front, Air France and KLM merged in 2004, Lufthansa acquired 
SN Brussels and Austrian Airlines in 2009, British Airways and Iberia 
merged in 2011, and Delta acquired forty-nine percent of Virgin Atlantic in 
2013. A Wall Street Journal blog speculated that the European airline 
industry might be poised for its own round of “U.S.-Style” consolidation.2
During that same time period, additional consolidations have been 
accomplished through joint ventures, alliances, and code sharing, often 
accompanied by grants of immunity from U.S. antitrust laws by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (USDOT). In 2008, USDOT granted statutory 
antitrust immunity (ATI) to a joint venture and alliance among Delta/
Northwest, Air France/KLM, Alitalia, and Czech Airlines to operate jointly 
between the United States and Europe.3 In 2010, USDOT did the same for 
American, British Airways, Iberia, Finnair, and Royal Jordanian.4 For travel 
between the United States and Japan, USDOT issued ATI separately for 
American and JAL to coordinate their service, and for United/Continental to 
coordinate with All Nippon Airways.5 And in 2013, USDOT granted ATI to 
 *  Senior Of Counsel, Morrison Foerster. 
1 “Legacy” airlines refer to the large, full-service carriers that existed prior to deregulation in the 
United States. 
2 Robert Wall, Europe’s Airlines May Be Readying for New, U.S.-Style Merger Round, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/09/17/europes-airlines-
may-be-readying-for-new-u-s-style-merger-round/.
3 Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., Docket No. OST-2007-28644 (Dep’t of Transp. May 22, 
2008) (final order); see also infra Part IV, discussing alliances and code sharing. 
4 America Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2008-0252 (Dep’t of Transp. July 20, 2010) (final 
order).
5 U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Docket No. DOT-OST-2010-0059 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 10, 2010) 
(final order). 
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Delta, Virgin Atlantic, Air France/KLM and Alitalia to operate jointly 
between North America and the United Kingdom.6
There is no better way to anticipate how the enforcement authorities will 
treat future consolidations than to understand what they have said and done 
in the past. Over the years, the major enforcement authorities, particularly in 
the United States and Europe, have been relatively transparent about their 
analytical approach to airline consolidations. Moreover, the analytics do not 
vary much by agency or type of consolidation (e.g., merger, asset acquisition, 
joint venture). Although this article refers primarily to government 
enforcement in the United States, other competition authorities, particularly 
that of the European Union, have applied a similar analytical paradigm for 
mergers and consolidations in the airline industry and elsewhere.7
II. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) 
enforces the U.S. antitrust laws in the airline and other industries. Mergers, 
acquisitions, and other consolidations in the airline industry are governed by 
the same substantive standards that apply to other industries, principally the 
standards set forth in section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 USDOT also applies the 
Clayton Act standards when analyzing the competitive effects of proposed 
international consolidations for ATI applications.9
USDOJ’s substantive antitrust analysis of proposed airline 
consolidations follows the general analytical paradigm set forth in the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Merger Guidelines) issued jointly by USDOJ 
and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.10 The steps in the review are to: (A) 
identify the relevant market(s) potentially affected by the transaction; (B) 
assess pre-and post-merger concentration in each of those markets; (C) 
evaluate the likely competitive effects of the merger, including (D) the 
6 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., Docket No. DOT-OST-2013-0068 (Dep’t of Transp. Sept. 23, 
2013) (final order). 
7 See, e.g., 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5 [hereinafter EU Guidelines]. 
8 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2014) (“No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of 
the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission 
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock 
by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly.”). 
9 “The intended commercial effects of the ATI Applicants’ respective joint venture agreements are 
similar to those resulting from a merger. As part of our overall analysis, we apply the Clayton Act test, 
which is used to predict the competitive effects of a proposed merger.” U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, supra
note 5, at 3. 
10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & F.T.C., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]. 
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likelihood of new entry; and finally to (E) consider any merger-specific 
efficiencies of the transaction that might offset any competitive harm. There 
also may be “failing firm” issues to consider, which might permit an 
otherwise anticompetitive consolidation to proceed.11
A.  Relevant Markets 
The first step in merger analysis under competition laws is to define the 
“relevant market” (or markets) affected by consolidation. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that defining a relevant market is necessary because any effect 
of the consolidation on competition can be determined only with respect to a 
relevant market.12 USDOJ methodology for defining relevant markets uses 
the hypothetical monopolist test as set forth in the Merger Guidelines.13
Following Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Guidelines refer to defining both 
a product market (“line of commerce”) and a geographic market (“section of 
the country”).14 These two concepts tend to converge in the airline industry, 
however, with USDOJ normally concluding that air travel between any given 
origin city and destination city (i.e., a “city pair”) is the appropriate relevant 
market for analyzing airline mergers. USDOJ reasons that a passenger who 
wants to fly from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco for a business meeting 
or a vacation will not view a flight from Washington, D.C., to Minneapolis 
as a reasonable substitute if fares to San Francisco increase. The courts and 
USDOT are generally in accord.15
1.  City or Airport Pairs 
While USDOJ typically views city pairs as the appropriate relevant 
markets in the airline industry, issues sometimes arise when multiple airports 
serve a single metropolitan area, as is the case in Washington D.C., New York 
City, Tokyo, and London. The question then becomes whether a hypothetical 
monopolist of flights from one airport, for instance, Washington Dulles 
11 See infra Part II.F. 
12 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957). 
13 The hypothetical monopolist test posits a monopoly supplier of a group of products or services 
in a candidate relevant market and asks whether it could profitably implement a “small but significant and 
non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP). The smallest group of products or services that satisfies the 
hypothetical monopolist test constitutes a relevant product or service market. Merger Guidelines, supra
note 10, at § 4.1. 
14 See supra note 8. 
15 See, e.g., Malaney v. UAL Corp., 434 F. App’x 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2011) (“national market in air
travel” improper; flights from San Francisco to Newark are not interchangeable with flights from Seattle 
to Miami); America Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2008-0252, 18 (Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 13, 2010) 
(show cause order) (“[R]elevant markets in the airline industry are transportation between city pairs. 
Demand is specific to city pairs; if the price of travel in City Pair A increases by a significant amount, 
consumers would not generally consider substituting travel in City Pair B.”).
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International Airport, could raise fares without losing a significant number of 
passengers to alternate airports, such as Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport (Washington National) or Baltimore/Washington International 
Thurgood Marshall Airport. 
2.  Time-sensitive Travelers and Nonstop Service 
The relevant market may be narrower than all scheduled airline service 
in a city pair. USDOJ has frequently maintained that nonstop service is a 
separate market from connecting service for a group of “time-sensitive” 
travelers—those passengers who would not switch to connecting service if 
the cost of nonstop service went up five or ten percent. In the early days of 
deregulation, some carriers with overlapping hubs merged. This involved 
numerous nonstop overlaps, which USDOJ opposed on that basis. More 
recently, USDOJ has focused on nonstop service overlaps for travel between 
the merging parties’ hubs, referred to as “hub-to-hub” markets.16
3.  Connecting Service Overlaps 
USDOJ will also look at one-stop overlaps if the merging parties are the 
dominant one-stop carriers on a significant number of city pairs. To identify 
potentially problematic one-stop city pair overlaps, DOJ will apply a traffic 
data screen. For example, a “50/5” screen would identify city pairs in which 
the merging carriers combined had at least fifty percent of the passengers, 
and the smaller carrier had at least five percent. In Appendix A to its 2013 
amended complaint against the US Airways-American Airlines merger, 
USDOJ listed over one-thousand overlap city pairs where the merger was 
“presumed” illegal, the vast majority of which were one-stop overlaps.17 In 
addition, USDOJ also assesses whether one-stop service provided by one 
party is the next best substitute to nonstop service offered by the other party. 
Appendix A included a number of these overlaps as well.18
4.  Airport Access 
A single airport also may be considered a relevant market when the 
transaction involves gates, or slots, at “constrained” airports.19 USDOJ has a 
16 In announcing its challenge of United Airlines’ proposed acquisition of US Airways in 2001, the 
USDOJ cited to, among other concerns, the loss of competition on the hub-to-hub nonstop routes of the 
parties. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t of Justice & Several States Will Sue to Stop United 
Airlines from Acquiring US Airways (July 27, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2001/8701.htm.
17 Amended Complaint at 44, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01236 
(D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) ECF No. 73, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f300400/300479.pdf. 
18 Id.
19 “Constrained” airports are those where the demand from carriers who want to serve the airport 
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long history of scrutinizing gate and slot acquisitions by dominant carriers at 
constrained airports.20 An airport may be constrained on airside capacity (a 
slot system has been established), groundside capacity (gates are fully leased 
with no ability to expand the number of gates rapidly), or both, so that new 
entry or expansion by incumbents at that airport is not feasible within a 
reasonable period of time. 
In 2013, one of the bases for USDOJ’s lawsuit challenging the US 
Airways/American Airlines merger was the increase in slot concentration at 
Washington National Airport that would occur as a result of the merger. 
According to USDOJ’s complaint, US Airways’ share of slots at Washington 
National would go from fifty-five percent to sixty-nine percent, and would 
eliminate existing and future head-to-head competition between the parties, 
effectively blocking other airlines’ competitive entry or expansion at 
Washington National.21
In 2010, USDOJ investigated the proposed slot swap between US 
Airways and Delta at Washington National and New York LaGuardia that 
would have increased each party’s already large share of slots at the 
respective airports. USDOJ did not challenge the US Airways/Delta slot 
swap under the antitrust laws; rather, it decided to file comments at the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),22 which administers slots 
nationwide and has separate legal authority to approve, disapprove, or 
conditionally approve the transaction. According to USDOJ, the transaction 
would have increased US Airways’ slot share at Washington National from 
forty-four percent to fifty-four percent and Delta’s share at LaGuardia from 
twenty-four percent to forty-nine percent.23 The FAA had proposed to 
approve the transaction subject to divestiture by the parties of forty slots at 
LaGuardia and twenty at Washington National. USDOJ filed comments in 
exceeds the capacity of the airport, such as London Heathrow, Chicago O’Hare, or Washington National. 
20 In 1989, USDOJ challenged Eastern Airlines’ proposals to sell eight gates at gate-constrained 
Philadelphia International Airport to USAir, which already operated a hub at that airport in competition 
with Eastern’s hub. In 1991, USDOJ challenged Eastern’s proposed sale of slots and gates at Washington 
National Airport to United, which operated what USDOJ considered a competing hub out of nearby Dulles 
International Airport. See Competition in the Airline Industry, at 2 (1999), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/2294.pdf (testimony of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
21 Complaint at ¶ 90, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01236 (D.D.C., Aug. 
13, 2013) ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f299900/299968.pdf. 
22 Any member of the public may file comments on proposed FAA actions, and the USDOJ 
frequently files comments at other federal agencies when government action affecting competition is 
proposed. USDOJ’s “competition advocacy” comments filed with FAA, USDOT, and other federal 
agencies are available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/comments.html. 
23  United States Department of Justice, Comments of the United States Department of Justice 
Before the Federal Aviation Administration Department of Transportation, Docket No. FAA-2010-0109 
at 5-6 (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/04/14/ 
257463.pdf.
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support of the FAA’s proposal, concluding that the divestitures would resolve 
its competitive concerns.24 The parties decided not to proceed with their 
transaction subject to those conditions but later reformulated the transaction 
and agreed to divest thirty-two slots at LaGuardia and sixteen at Washington 
National. The FAA approved the reformulated transaction in 2011.25
B.  Concentration 
The Merger Guidelines and the EU Guidelines advise that market shares 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration are 
calculated pre and post-transaction. The HHI is the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of the competitors in the relevant market and, thus, gives more 
weight to firms with larger market shares. Market shares may be measured in 
revenue (ticket sales), units sold (passengers), or capacity (seats or flights 
operated). The Merger Guidelines classify markets with an HHI under 1500 
as “unconcentrated” and over 2500 as “highly concentrated,” and presume 
that a merger that increases the HHI by more than 200 points in a “highly 
concentrated” market is likely to enhance market power.26 The EU is unlikely 
to challenge a merger with a post-merger HHI below 2000 with an increase 
less than 250 or above 2000 if the increase is less than 150, unless special 
circumstances are present.27 A duopoly route of two equal-size carriers would 
have an HHI of 5000 and a four-to-three-merger resulting in equal-size 
carriers would have a post-merger HHI of 3333. 
For nonstop overlaps, USDOJ practice in the airline industry often has 
been to count the number of carriers that are currently providing the relevant 
service or are well-positioned to provide it. Once a carrier is deemed able to 
provide the service, such as by having a hub at one of the end points, it is 
normally considered an easy matter for that carrier to add and subtract 
capacity on a route. As a result, snapshots of passenger or revenue shares on 
the route are not necessarily meaningful. Accordingly, city pairs that are 
impacted by a proposed consolidation have been categorized as “two-to-one” 
or “three-to-two,” etc.28
For one-stop or other connecting overlaps, USDOJ has examined 
whether the parties’ connecting hubs are particularly well-positioned to 
provide connecting service on a city pair. In announcing its challenge of 
24 Id. at 2–3. 
25 Delta Airlines Inc., Docket No. FAA-2010-0109 at 5-6 (FAA Oct. 13, 2011) (notice of grant of 
petition with conditions). 
26 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 5.3. 
27 EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part III, ¶20. 
28 See e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 31–32, United States v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 1998) (listing two-to-one overlap routes and routes served only by Northwest, but 
for which Continental had a hub at the opposite end point). 
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United’s proposed acquisition of US Airways, USDOJ noted that the parties’ 
East Coast hubs made them “the only two airlines, or two of only three 
airlines, offering connecting service between [various East Coast city 
pairs].”29 And again in its 2013 complaint against the US Airways/American 
Airlines merger, USDOJ included an appendix that listed post-merger HHIs, 
measured in ticket revenue, and the changes in them, for over one-thousand 
city-pair markets affected, most of which were connecting markets.30 Each 
of the listed city pairs had a post-merger HHI greater than 2500, an increase 
in its HHI of over 200, and was a city pair where the merger was 
“presumptively illegal” according to the complaint. 
C.  Competitive Effects 
Identifying city pairs where a consolidation will result in a potentially 
problematic level of concentration is an important but not dispositive step. 
The next step is to determine what the likely effect of the increased 
concentration will be on prices and output. Enforcement authorities have 
identified two possible means by which consumers can be harmed with price 
increases or output reductions resulting from a merger: “unilateral” effects 
and “coordinated” effects.31
Unilateral effects arise when competition between the products of the 
merging firms is eliminated, allowing the merged entity to unilaterally 
exercise market power, for instance, by profitably raising the price of one or 
both merging parties’ products, thus, harming consumers. In markets for 
relatively undifferentiated products (e.g., commodities or other fungible 
products or services), unilateral effects are more likely when two significant 
competitors merge to create a dominant seller. In markets for undifferentiated 
products or services, enforcement authorities will look primarily at market 
shares and the capacity currently available in the market. In differentiated 
product mergers, that is, where the merging parties’ products compete but are 
imperfect substitutes (e.g., automobiles), unilateral effect concerns arise 
when the two merging companies’ products are particularly close substitutes 
in the eyes of consumers—the closer the substitutability, the greater the 
concern about unilateral effects. Scheduled airline service does not 
necessarily fit neatly into either category, and the enforcement agencies will 
likely consider both possibilities. 
Coordinated effects arise if the merger could increase the probability 
that, post-merger, merging parties and their competitors will successfully be 
29 See supra note 16. 
30 Complaint at App. A, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01236 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 13, 2013) ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f299900/299968.pdf. 
31 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at §§ 6-7; EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part IV, ¶ 22. 
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able to coordinate their behavior, or better coordinate their behavior, in an 
anti-competitive way, for example, by raising prices. The primary task of 
enforcers is to determine whether market characteristics exist that make 
coordination easier, such as market transparency, product homogeneity, and 
numerous small transactions with buyers. Anticompetitive coordination is 
more likely to emerge in markets where it is relatively simple for sellers to 
agree on how they will coordinate. In addition, for coordination to be 
sustainable, the coordinating firms must be able to monitor each other to 
assure themselves that others are not cheating on the agreement, and there 
must be some form of credible punishment mechanism if deviation is 
detected. Further, the reactions of outsiders, such as current and future 
competitors not participating in the coordination, as well as customers, 
should not be able to defeat the coordination.32
In the past, USDOJ has concluded that anticompetitive coordination 
among firms in the airline industry is possible and has in fact occurred. 
Empirical research conducted by USDOJ economists and others has 
supported these conclusions about coordinated effects in the airline industry. 
The airline industry is data-rich, and USDOJ collects traffic data from 
USDOT, the parties, and other sources in order to measure the correlation 
between concentration (the number of carriers, market shares, or HHIs) and 
fare levels across city pairs. USDOJ has consistently found that fares for 
nonstop service are higher when there are fewer nonstop carriers on a route, 
which indicates that nonstop fares are constrained by other nonstop service, 
but not by connecting service, at least not until the fare differential or distance 
traveled, and, hence, the time of travel becomes large.33
In the past, USDOJ has also examined whether two merging airlines are 
often the first and second best-positioned bidders for a significant number of 
corporate or government travel contracts.34 This inquiry includes an overlap 
city-pair analysis, but also looks at whether the two carriers’ entire networks, 
including service amenities, schedule frequencies, and international service 
or alliances, make them particularly attractive alternatives to one another 
32 See generally Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at §7.2; EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part 
IV, ¶¶ 39-57. 
33 The existence of a “hub premium” in fares has not escaped the attention of savvy travel agents 
and others. In 1996, a class of air travelers sued under the antitrust laws a group of major carriers who 
refused to sell so-called “hidden city” tickets. The “hidden city” practice involved the passenger 
purchasing a lower-priced one-stop ticket that connected at the carrier’s hub, deplaning at the hub and 
simply discarding the unused portion of the ticket. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 
F.R.D. 174 (E.D. Mich. 2002). While travelers may have considered the practice a clever form of arbitrage, 
carriers viewed it as fraudulent, and have battled the practice for years. Nevertheless, the practice remains 
and continues to be contentious. See, e.g., Patrick Gillespie, Why Is United Airlines Suing a 22-year-old?,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 31, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/29/news/united-orbitz-sue-
skiplagged-22/.
34 See, e.g., supra note 16. 
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given the demands of large corporate (or government) customers. 
D.  Entry 
The prospect of new entry (that is, entry induced by the merger) may be 
sufficient to alleviate competitive concerns if the entry would be timely, 
likely, and sufficient to counteract an anticompetitive fare increase in the 
relevant market.35 At one time, hub economics were so powerful that it was 
rare for one carrier to enter a city pair with another carrier’s hub at one end 
point, except from its own hub. More recently, the proliferation of low cost 
carriers (LCCs) offering point-to-point service has increased the number of 
city pairs where point-to-point entry is economically feasible. At the same 
time, legacy carriers have lowered their cost structures, through bankruptcy 
and otherwise, to reduce their cost disadvantage relative to LCCs. The effect 
of lower costs is that legacies are now better able to enter some non-hub 
markets on a point-to-point basis. USDOJ asks whether the new entrant 
would be profitable at premerger prices, placing significant weight on the 
prior history of entry in city pairs in response to an increase in fares or 
margins in that market. USDOJ still considers it likely that a carrier will enter 
a spoke emanating from its hub, but it also realizes that a legacy carrier may 
well enter routes to and from any city where it has significant service and 
brand identity. Nevertheless, there remain many thin connecting routes 
between smaller cities that are likely only servable by a hub-and-spoke 
network carrier. 
One entry barrier that frequently comes up in airline consolidations is 
airport access at slot-constrained airports. Slot constraints, by definition, 
mean that there are carriers who would like to enter or expand their service 
at an airport, but cannot because they lack slots (and/or gates or other ground 
facilities). A number of airline consolidations in the United States and Europe 
have been allowed to proceed when the merging parties agreed to divest slots 
at constrained airports to competitors.36
E.  Efficiencies 
Under the Merger Guidelines, DOJ also considers the efficiencies that 
35 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 9. 
36 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires US Airways and 
American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-Wide Competition and 
Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/
2013/301616.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United Airlines and Continental Airlines Transfer 
Assets to Southwest Airlines in Response to Department of Justice’s Antitrust Concerns (Aug. 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/262002.pdf; and Press Release, Eur. 
Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed Takeover of Austrian Airlines by Lufthansa, Subject to 
Conditions (Aug. 28, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-
1255_en.htm?locale=fr.
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result from a proposed merger or acquisition, but it only gives weight to those 
efficiencies that are “merger-specific” (i.e., unlikely to happen in the absence 
of the merger), well-defined, and reasonably substantiated.37 Even those 
cognizable efficiencies are likely to make a difference only when the 
expected adverse competitive effects (absent the efficiencies) are not great.38
Among the efficiencies that USDOJ has favorably considered in connection 
with proposed airline mergers and acquisitions, are the merged carrier’s 
ability to provide improved online service to more destinations, cost savings 
in airport operations, information technology, fleet optimization, and supply 
chain economics, all to the benefit of consumers.39 Under the EU Guidelines, 
efficiencies must benefit consumers, be merger-specific, and be verifiable.40
F.  Failing Firms and Assets 
A transaction that might initially appear to be anticompetitive may be 
allowed to proceed if the parties demonstrate that one of the parties is a 
“failing firm.” The failing firm defense is well established in U.S. antitrust 
law and applies to the airline industry in the same manner as other 
industries.41 The basic policy underlying the defense is that an otherwise 
anticompetitive acquisition will not harm competition or consumers if the 
firm and its assets would exit the relevant market(s) without the transaction. 
The key elements of the failing firm defense are: 
•? Imminent failure of the firm (or a subsidiary, division, or 
group of assets); 
•? The firm cannot successfully reorganize in bankruptcy or 
otherwise; and 
•? There is no reasonable less anticompetitive purchaser for the 
firm or assets. 
Both USDOJ and the EU have applied the failing firm doctrine in the airline 
37 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 10. 
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Att’y Gen. R. Hewitt Pate 
Regarding the Closing of the America West/US Airways Investigation (June 23, 2005), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/209709.pdf; and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of 
the Merger of Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.pdf. 
40 EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part VII, ¶78. 
41 “[W]here the evidence suggests a failing firm will not be able successfully to reorganize, we 
agree it may be better to be acquired by a competitor than to suffer liquidation. A good example of this is 
American Airlines’ acquisition of its competitor TWA, which was bankrupt, out of money, and without 
another buyer.” See Antitrust for Airlines, at 9, Before the Reg’l Airline Ass’n President’s Council Meeting 
(2005) (remarks by J. Bruce McDonald Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of Justice), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/217987.pdf. 
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industry.42
III. PARTIAL ACQUISITIONS
Although most transactions that are the subject of government antitrust 
scrutiny involve the acquisition of complete ownership and control, partial 
acquisitions—including partial acquisitions in the airline industry—also have 
been challenged. The analytic framework that USDOJ uses to analyze partial 
acquisitions is described in Section 13 of the Merger Guidelines. If a partial 
acquisition gives the acquiring party effective control over the target firm or 
involves substantially all of the relevant assets of the target firm, the 
transaction is analyzed like a complete acquisition.43 If a partial acquisition 
does not result in effective control of the target firm or substantially all of its 
relevant assets, then the issue is whether the transaction is likely to lessen 
competition (1) by giving the acquiring firm the ability to influence the 
competitive conduct of the target firm; (2) by reducing the incentive of either 
firm to compete aggressively with the other; or (3) by giving the acquiring 
firm access to nonpublic, competitively sensitive information of the target 
firm that could facilitate collusive conduct.44
In 1998, USDOJ challenged Northwest Airlines’ partial acquisition of 
Continental Airlines. Northwest was then the fourth largest airline in the 
United States, and Continental was the fifth largest.45 According to the 
amended complaint, Northwest and Continental competed on price and 
service in “thousands of routes throughout the United States” and were “each 
other’s most significant competitor . . . on seven densely traveled routes 
between cities where they operate[d] their hubs—Detroit, Memphis, and 
Minneapolis for Northwest; and Cleveland, Houston, and Newark for 
Continental.”46 On five of those seven routes their combined share of nonstop 
flights was one hundred percent; on the other two it was ninety-three percent 
and eighty-three percent, respectively.47
Over a period of several months in 1998, Northwest acquired sufficient 
Continental stock to give it fifty-one percent of the voting power over 
Continental and the consequent ability to influence virtually all of 
42 Id.; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of Greek Airline 
Olympic Air by Aegean Airlines (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
927_en.htm; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces It Won’t 
Challenge American Airlines/TWA Acquisition (Mar. 16, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/press_releases/2001/7682.htm.
43 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at §13. 
44 Id.
45 Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, United States v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 
18, 1998). 
46 Id. ¶¶ 2, 3 at 2. 
47 Id. ¶ 31 at 10. 
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Continental’s management decisions, including decisions regarding its 
competitive conduct.48 USDOJ believed that Northwest’s ownership of a 
controlling interest in Continental also would reduce the incentive of each 
carrier to compete against the other.49 It concluded that Northwest’s partial 
acquisition would diminish actual competition in the seven hub-to-hub 
markets and in “numerous other markets,” as well as potential competition in 
additional key markets, thereby creating the likelihood of increased fares and 
decreased service.50
The case ultimately settled during trial. Under the terms of the 
settlement, Northwest agreed to divest all but seven percent of the voting 
interest in Continental, and to accept significant restrictions on its ability to 
vote any stock it retained.51
In December 2012, Delta Air Lines reached an agreement to purchase 
the forty-nine percent stake in Virgin Atlantic that was then held by 
Singapore Airlines. At that time, Delta and Virgin Atlantic had nonstop 
overlaps in two transatlantic markets—New York-London and Boston-
London—and Delta’s one-stop services overlapped with Virgin Atlantic’s 
nonstop flights on another ten routes between North America and London 
and Birmingham. However, there were other significant competitors on all 
of those routes. British Airways and American Airlines, which operate under 
a joint venture agreement on North Atlantic routes, were very robust 
competitors on the overlapping nonstop routes in particular. Presumably 
because Delta did not plan to acquire a majority stake in Virgin Atlantic, and 
because other viable airlines would continue to provide competitive 
constraints, both EU and US competition authorities determined not to 
challenge the proposed transaction.52
IV. AIRLINE ALLIANCES AND CODE SHARING
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, prohibits conspiracies and 
agreements that restrain or eliminate competition.53 Agreements between 
48 Id. ¶¶ 14, 16 at 5. 
49 Id. ¶ 37 at 12. 
50 Id. ¶ 38 at 12. 
51 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department Announces Tentative Settlement in Northwest-
Continental Lawsuit (Nov. 6, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2000/
6905.htm.
52  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
on Its Decision To Close Its Investigation of Delta Air Lines’ Acquisition of an Equity Interest in Virgin 
Atlantic Airways (June 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/
298788.htm; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed Joint Acquisition of 
Virgin Atlantic by Delta and Virgin Group (June 20, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-587_en.htm.
53 “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
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direct competitors, such as two airlines serving the same markets, are referred 
to as “horizontal” agreements and are normally challenged as restraining 
competition between the two parties. Agreements between parties at different 
levels of production or distribution, such as between an airline and a travel 
agent or corporate client, are referred to as “vertical agreements” and are 
normally challenged as exclusionary, that is, as inhibiting competition from 
actual or potential competitors of one of the parties.54 In addition, like 
participants in other transportation or network industries, airlines can be both 
horizontally and vertically related to one another, depending on the situation. 
For example, airlines that interline passengers with one another are in a 
vertical relationship with respect to that traffic, even though they are direct 
competitors for other traffic. Alliances and code sharing agreements may, 
therefore, constitute horizontal agreements in some city-pair markets but 
vertical agreements in others. 
A.  Horizontal Agreements  
Horizontal agreements have been classified by the U.S. courts as either 
“per se illegal” or subject to a “rule of reason” analysis to determine their 
legality.55 Rule of reason cases are further subdivided into “quick look” cases 
and “full rule of reason” cases. 
Any agreement that is not illegal per se is analyzed in the United States 
under the rule of reason. The basic test under the rule of reason is whether, 
on balance, the restraint “is one that promotes competition or one that 
suppresses competition.”56 The rule of reason does not permit a restraint on 
competition to be justified by social or other non-competition related 
policies.57 The net adverse effect on competition must be significant, rather 
than trivial or attenuated.58
Most agreements between or among airlines are subject to a rule of 
reason analysis because they are potentially pro-competitive, or at least 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2004).
54 See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (discussing horizontal 
and vertical agreements); In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, n.34 (E.D. Mich. 
2002) (discussing horizontal and vertical agreements in the airline industry). 
55 The per se rule provides that once a plaintiff establishes that an agreement is of a certain nature 
(horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation, and certain group boycotts), the adverse effect on 
competition is presumed without detailed examination of market conditions and impact. The per se rule 
is reserved for an agreement that “facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to 
restrict competition and decrease output.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
19-20 (1979). Suspected per se conduct will often be investigated by USDOJ as a criminal matter (e.g.,
the air cargo prosecutions). 
56 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). 
57 Id.
58 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972). 
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competitively neutral. Common examples include interline agreements,59
alliance agreements, code-sharing, information exchanges, joint ventures of 
all sorts, including industry joint ventures,60 and trade associations.61
Domestic code-share alliances are joint ventures between or among 
airlines and are subject to the normal operation of the Sherman Act. Like 
international alliances, domestic alliances involve agreements on fares 
among the parties, sometimes on overlapping routes. USDOJ applies a 
standard rule of reason analysis to domestic alliances and may challenge 
them in court. By statute, however, a domestic alliance must also be 
submitted to USDOT for its review and approval under 49 U.S.C. § 41720 to 
determine whether it constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice or unfair 
method of competition under 49 U.S.C. § 41712, formerly Section 411 of the 
Federal Aviation Act.62 Although USDOJ did not challenge the Delta/
Northwest/Continental domestic alliance under the Sherman Act, USDOT 
imposed, at the behest of USDOJ, conditions on its approval under its statute 
that limited certain joint pricing activity by the parties.63 Under USDOT’s 
approval order: 
•? No code-sharing is permitted for local traffic on routes 
where more than one of the carriers offers nonstop service, 
including their hub-to-hub routes. 
•? Each carrier must act independently in establishing the terms 
59 An interline agreement allows one carrier to sell an itinerary, or part of an itinerary, on a second 
carrier, which commonly occurs when a connecting flight requires two or more different carriers. See
Arpad Szakal, Interline and Code-share Agreements, http://www.aviationlaw.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2013/09/Interline-and-code-share-agreements.pdf (explaining interline and code sharing agreements). 
60 Industry-wide joint ventures include the Airlines Tariff Publishing Company (ATP) and the 
Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC). A consumer class action survived summary judgment where the 
class alleged that Northwest, Delta and US Airways conspired with ARC to prohibit the sale of “hidden 
city” tickets. See generally In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
The court rejected a “fraud prevention” defense, holding that disclosure of a passenger’s true itinerary was 
unilaterally imposed by the carriers and not a bargained-for element of sale for the passenger, and, thus, 
the elements of “fraud” were not present. Moreover, the information exchanged added nothing to the 
information each carrier possessed about its own passengers, so the exchange “enabled” no fraud 
prevention as in Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925). 
61 Industry trade associations include Airlines for America (formerly known as the Air Transport 
Association) or the International Air Transport Association (IATA). 
62 In theory, international joint ventures and alliances are subject to the normal operation of the 
antitrust laws, but in practice, such alliances apply to USDOT for statutory immunity, where the 
competitive issues are examined with USDOJ input. See Proposed Final Judgment No. 147-2 at Part IV.C 
(Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/818343/amr111213.txt.
63 See Termination of Review Under 49 U.S.C. 41720 of Delta/Northwest/Continental 
Agreements, 68 Fed. Reg. 16854 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/
2003/04/07/03-8288/termination-of-review-under-49-usc-41720-of-deltanorthwestcontinental-
agreements; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Approves Northwest/
Continental/Delta Marketing Alliance With Conditions (Jan. 17, 2003), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2003/200645.pdf. 
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and conditions of its frequent flyer programs and in bidding 
on corporate contracts, although the carriers may offer a 
customer the option of a joint bid when consistent with the 
antitrust laws. 
•? Each carrier must observe restrictions on the extent to which 
it can set prices on flights operated by another carrier.64
B.  Vertical Agreements 
Alliances and code-sharing can also raise vertical issues. Most airlines 
are both competitors and customers of other airlines. When two airlines are 
both offering to sell a seat to the same passenger to travel between the same 
cities, they are direct horizontal competitors. When those same two airlines 
interline connecting passengers with one another, they are in essence buying 
and selling through passengers to one another and are, thus, in a vertical 
relationship. When two vertically related airlines enter an alliance or code 
share agreement, other airlines that had previously obtained interline 
passengers from one of the alliance parties might find that the alliance 
partners favor each other to such an extent that they can no longer obtain 
connecting interline passengers on the same terms. Competition laws treat 
this as an “exclusive dealing” situation. Exclusive dealing is usually, but not 
always, permissible under the antitrust laws. 
In the international context, for example, it is possible that in some 
gateway-to-gateway markets, carriers must be able to obtain a minimum 
number of interline passengers from behind the gateway cities in order for 
their gateway-to-gateway leg to be economically viable. If, as a result of an 
alliance or code-share agreement, a competitor of one of the partners was 
forced to exit the gateway-to-gateway route, fares on that route could 
increase, in turn harming consumers and raising “vertical foreclosure” 
concerns under competition laws. Whether a particular alliance agreement 
would constitute illegal foreclosure depends on many factors, including other 
sources of connecting passengers and the efficiencies generated by the 
alliance. Although competition authorities have not challenged airline 
64 The marketing carrier’s fares must be the same as the operating carrier’s fares on routes that are 
not served by the marketing airline (the marketing airline is the airline that does not operate the flight but 
nonetheless sells seats under its code). On routes served by two or more of the partners with connecting 
service, when one airline is the marketing airline it must sell seats on flights operated by the partner airline 
for the same fares it charges for its own flights or for the fares established by the operating airline. On 
routes where one airline offers nonstop service and the other airline offers connecting service, the latter 
airline’s fares for the nonstop service must be the same as the operating carrier’s fares. See Termination
of Review Under 49 U.S.C. 41720 of Delta/Northwest/Continental Agreements, 68 Fed. Reg. 16854 n.1 
(Apr. 7, 2003), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2003/04/07/03-8288/termination-of-
review-under-49-usc-41720-of-deltanorthwestcontinental-agreements. The stated purpose of the 
restrictions is to prevent such pricing practices from becoming a vehicle for signaling and collusion. 
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alliances on vertical grounds in the past, the possibility remains. 
Not only have authorities shown a lack of interest in airline foreclosure 
cases, a private antitrust case that raised foreclosure issues failed. Virgin 
Atlantic tried to challenge British Airways’ use of contracts with travel 
agencies and corporate clients that awarded increased loyalty discounts when 
certain sales thresholds were reached.65 Virgin had argued that these contracts 
prevented or delayed (i.e., foreclosed) its entry on certain city pair routes. 
The court rejected Virgin’s claims on multiple grounds, including that Virgin 
had failed to show harm to competition on the routes in question, such as 
higher fares, lower output, or reduced service quality.66
C.  Antitrust Immunity for International Alliances 
Agreements between and among domestic and foreign airlines are 
eligible for statutory antitrust immunity (ATI) under 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308-09. 
USDOT is responsible for deciding whether such an agreement meets the 
statutory requirements for immunity. The Secretary may grant ATI upon a 
finding that the agreement is “required by the public interest.”67 Moreover, 
the Secretary shall grant ATI to any agreement that “substantially reduces or 
eliminates competition”68 if the Secretary also determines that the agreement 
“is necessary to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important 
public benefits (including international comity and foreign policy 
considerations),” and the “transportation need cannot be met or those benefits 
cannot be achieved by reasonably available alternatives that are materially 
less anticompetitive.”69 USDOT has described the process as a two-step 
analysis starting with the competitive analysis, followed by the benefits 
analysis, with the burden on opponents to show competitive harm, and on the 
parties to demonstrate countervailing benefits.70
V. REMEDIES
USDOJ has no authority to disapprove a merger or enjoin alleged 
anticompetitive conduct on its own; rather, it must file a lawsuit seeking relief 
from a federal district court.71 Section 4 of the Sherman Act and Section 15 
65 Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001). 
66 Id. at 264. 
67 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
68 49 U.S.C. § 41308(c) (1994) (emphasis added); 49 U.S.C. § 41309(c)(2) (1996). 
69 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1) (1996). 
70 Final Order at 7-8, Joint Application of American Airlines, Inc., (July 20, 2010) (No. DOT-OST-
208-0252), available at http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostpdf78/834.pdf. 
71 Post-complaint, USDOJ may seek additional discovery through interrogatories, requests for 
admissions, document requests, and depositions pursuant to the usual discovery tools provided to plaintiffs 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These tools are in addition to USDOJ’s pre-complaint 
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of the Clayton Act confer jurisdiction on federal district courts “to prevent 
and restrain violations” of the antitrust laws by injunction and authorize the 
government “to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such 
violations.” In fashioning relief, courts may enjoin repetition of past 
violations and seek to restore competitive conditions. The equitable merger 
remedies potentially available to USDOJ include preliminary or permanent 
injunctive relief preventing the consolidation, divestiture of assets, and 
behavioral relief. 
In merger cases, USDOJ prefers “structural” remedies such as asset 
divestiture, which once accomplished, require no further oversight. 
According to its Policy Guide To Merger Remedies, USDOJ “will pursue a 
divestiture remedy in the vast majority of cases involving horizontal 
mergers.”72 Although it is common for merger consent decrees to allow 
parties to consummate their merger and accomplish the divestiture afterward, 
the time allowed to do so is limited. “Generally, the [USDOJ] will allow the 
parties an opportunity to find a purchaser on their own within sixty to ninety 
days,”73 but USDOJ always reserves the right to approve any proposed 
purchaser.74 Such post-consummation divestiture decrees are accompanied 
by a stipulated “Hold Separate” order requiring the merged firm to preserve 
the divestiture assets. 
The most common forms of non-structural (“conduct”) relief in merger 
cases are information firewalls, nondiscrimination requirements, mandatory 
licensing, transparency provisions, anti-retaliation provisions, as well as 
prohibitions on certain contracting practices.75
Boilerplate provisions generally contained in USDOJ decrees include 
provisions terminating the challenged conduct, requiring specific compliance 
efforts, arranging for periodic compliance reports, and permitting inspection 
of company records. USDOJ decrees are almost always limited in duration, 
most often ten years. 
The most recent example of a USDOJ enforcement action in the airline 
industry occurred in 2013. After a six-month investigation, USDOJ, along 
with five states and the District of Columbia, filed a lawsuit in August 2013 
alleging that the merger of American Airlines and US Airways, if 
implemented, would violate Section 7 and should be enjoined.76 USDOJ 
investigatory powers. 
72 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011) at 5, available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf. 
73 Id. at 25. 
74 Id.
75 Id. at 13. 
76 See generally Complaint, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc. (No. 1:13-CV-012360) 
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. v. US/AA].
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pointed to fare and fee increases and capacity reductions that had followed 
recent industry consolidation.77
American and US Airways had seventeen nonstop overlapping routes,78
but USDOJ’s analysis gave considerable weight to other factors as well. 
According to USDOJ, “[t]he merger would create the largest airline in the 
world and result in four airlines [American, United, Delta, and Southwest] 
controlling eighty percent of the United States commercial air travel 
market.”79 It alleged that adverse competitive impacts would be felt in “more 
than a thousand routes where one or both offer connecting service,”80 and at 
Washington National Airport, where “the combined firm would control 69% 
of the slots,” substantially raising barriers to entry.81 USDOJ claimed that 
fares and ancillary fees would rise, citing the likely termination of US 
Airways’ discount Advantage Fares and the increased likelihood of 
coordinated behavior.82 It also contended that there were insufficient 
“acquisition-specific and cognizable efficiencies” to offset the alleged 
adverse competitive effects,83 and that, far from being a “failing firm,” 
American was “likely to exit bankruptcy as a vigorous competitor” in the 
absence of the merger.84
On November 12, 2013, USDOJ announced that it had reached an 
agreement with the parties that would settle the lawsuit.85 Under the terms of 
the settlement, which was set forth in a Proposed Final Judgment filed in the 
district court the same day, the parties would divest slots, gates and related 
facilities at both Washington National (104 slots, up to five gates and related 
ground facilities) and New York LaGuardia (34 slots and up to two gates and 
related ground facilities) Airports. In addition, the parties also agreed to 
divest two gates and related facilities at five key airports: Boston Logan, 
77 Id. ¶ 4, at 4; id. ¶ 35 at 14. 
78 Id. ¶ 82 at 30. The 17 nonstop overlaps were fewer than the number of nonstop overlaps between 
Southwest and AirTran, whose merger USDOJ did not challenge in 2011. 
79 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Challenging 
Proposed Merger Between US Airways and American Airlines (Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/299960.htm  
80 Complaint, U.S. v. US/AA, ¶ 82 at 30.
81 Id. ¶¶ 83, 84 at 30. 
82 See generally id. ¶¶ 41-67 at 15-26; see generally id. ¶¶ 71-81 at 27-30. US Airways offers 
Advantage Fares on many connecting routes in competition with nonstop fares offered by legacy carriers. 
According to USDOJ, these fares “have proven highly disruptive to the industry’s overall coordinated 
pricing dynamic,” id. ¶ 54 at 21, i.e., they have disciplined fares for nonstop service by the legacy carriers. 
83 Id. ¶ 94 at 33. 
84 Press Release, supra note 79. 
85 See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires US Airways 
and American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-Wide Competition 
and Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2013/301616.htm.
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Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International, and Miami 
International. The carriers purchasing the divestiture assets had to be 
approved by USDOJ, which stated that it intended to give preference to 
carriers not already operating a large number of flights at the airports in 
question.86 The Proposed Final Judgment required the parties to first offer to 
Southwest and JetBlue the slots each was currently leasing from American at 
LaGuardia Airport (LGA) (10 slots to Southwest) and Washington National 
(16 slots to JetBlue.)87 Thereafter, the remaining slots would be divested to 
at least two carriers at Washington National and one at LaGuardia.88 The slots 
were to be divested within 90 days and the gates and facilities within 180 
days.89 Consistent with USDOJ practice, a Divestiture Trustee would be 
appointed to carry out the divestitures if the parties failed to do so.90 The 
parties are prohibited from re-acquiring the divested assets during the term 
of the Proposed Final Judgment, which is ten years, also a standard 
provision.91 The Proposed Final Judgment was entered by the court on April 
25, 2014, as the Final Judgment without modification. 
86 See Proposed Final Judgment at IV.A; id.
87 See Part IV.F, G. 
88 Id.
89 See id. Part IV.C-D. 
90 See id. Part V.A. 
91 See id. Parts XII, XVI. 
